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I INTRODUCTION 
The case of Hunter v Canary Wharf is an interesting development in the 
law of private nuisance. Approximately 600 plaintiffs claimed damages for 
loss of use and enjoyment of their homes due to disruption of television 
viewing and excessive dust. The plaintiffs argued that when it comes to 
interference with a neighbour' s quiet enjoyment of his or her land, the right 
to bring an action in nuisance is not confined to those with a proprietary 
interest, but extends to all those who occupy the property as their home. 
This claim opened the way for the Lords to explore the nature of the tort 
of nuisance, and its place in the common law. Their judgments exhibited 
two diverse styles of judicial law-making. The Majority offered a classic 
legal analysis based on the concept that the tort of nuisance protects 
property, while Lord Cooke' s approach proposed the tort be moulded to 
reflect the modern expectations of ordinary citizens. 
The law of torts is concerned with compensating an injured party, generally 
for something that party already had rather than for not getting something 
he or she might have expected to get. 2 We have a tort of nuisance, as 
opposed to merely a general policy aiming to do justice between the 
parties, so that guidelines are established and people can have a degree of 
certainty about their ability to obtain a remedy. In assessing whether the 
majority or Lord Cooke ' s method produced the better result it becomes 
clear that the latter approach ultimately makes more sense. The majority 
decision impacts heavily on people who do not have a proprietary interest 
in land, especially women and children. 
This paper will proceed in six parts. Part II gives a brief history of the case. 
Part III looks closely at the majority decisions. Part IV assesses Lord 
Cooke's dissenting judgment. Following this, Part V considers the impact 
of the decision and canvasses some alternative approaches. Part VI looks 
1 
[ 1997] l WLR 684 (Canary Wharf) . 
2Todd, S. (ed.) The law a/ Torts in New Zealand (2ed. Brookers, Wellington, 1997) 7. 
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at the impact of the decision on the law of private nmsance m New 
Zealand. Lastly, in Part VII, some conclusions are drawn as to the overall 
scope and impact of the decision in Canary Wharf 
II HISTORY OF THE CASE 
The Canary Wharf Tower is a landmark on London ' s Docklands. The 250 
metre high, 50 metre square, stainless steel-clad construction was erected 
in 1989. Its presence has been the source of considerable civil litigation 
arising from effects of the construction process and from the nature of the 
completed structure. In Canary Wharf the plaintiff and approximately 600 
co-plaintiffs, many the spouses and children of those with a proprietary 
interest in properties in the vicinity of the tower, claimed damages for 
nuisance created by the presence of the tower which caused interference 
with television reception. The Tower cast a reception shadow over an area 
on the Isle of Dogs until a relay was built on top of the building in April 
1991 . The Lords considered two issues. First, whether the presence of a 
tall building which interferes with television can constitute an actionable 
nuisance. Second, the nature of the right to sue in private nuisance. 
A separate action for interference due to dust caused by construction of the 
Limehouse Link Road was heard concurrently. This involved essentially 
the same group of plaintiffs and the sole issue considered was whether they 
had standing to sue. 
At first instance Judge Havery Q.C. held that interference with television 
reception is capable of constituting an actionable nuisance but that a right 
of exclusive possession of land is necessary to entitle a person to sue in 
private nuisance. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Judge 
Ha very on both issues. Pill LJ delivered the ju<lgment of the court, holding 
that the creation or presence of a building in the line of sight between a 
television transmitter and other properties is not actionable as an 
interference with the use and enjoyment of land, but that occupation of 
property as a home provided a sufficiently substantial link to enable the 
4 
occupier to sue m private nmsance. The House of Lords unanimously 
upheld the Court of Appeal's decision on television signals. However, the 
majority reversed the findings on the right to sue. Lord Cooke dissented on 
this point. 
ill THE MAJORITY DECISION 
This Part assesses the judgments of Lord Goff, Lord Hoffman, Lord Lloyd 
and Lord Hope in light of the traditional boundaries of the law of private 
nuisance. 
A The Origins and Scope of Private Nuisance 
The origins of the tort of nuisance are obscure but stem from three 
different sources. 3 These three essentially different forms are still 
recognisable today. From the Twelfth Century an action lay in the assize of 
nuisance, which was originally part of the assize of disseisin, but later 
became distinct from it. Disseisin is "a wrongful putting out of rum that is 
seised of the freehold" . 
4 This was intended to protect a property right and 
could only be brought by a freeholder against a freeholder. In its modem 
form, an action for interference with an easement or profit has its origins 
here. 5 The second source was found witrun "the pleas of the Crown" 
remediable on indictment before the King's justices as a misdemeanour. 
Interference with the neighbourhood, particularly the highway, was known 
as common or public nuisance. This is the origin of public nuisance in the 
modern law of torts. An action on the case for interferences gradually came 
to be recognised. This developed into the tort of private nuisance where 
remedies are available for annoyance to the occupier of land resulting from 
some act or omission on the land of another. The historic focus in each of 
these forms has been on the problem caused to the land 
3Vennell, M. A. , "The essentials of nuisance: a discussion of recent New Zealand 
developments in the tort of nuisance" ( 1977) 4 Otago LR 56. 
4as defined in Black 's Law Dictionary (6ed, St Paul, Minnesota, 1995) 
5Sed/eigh-Denjie/d v O 'Callaghan [1940] AC 880, 902 (HL). 
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There are three types of private nuisances. 
6 First, nwsance by 
encroachment on a neighbour' s land. Second, nuisance by direct physical 
injury to a neighbour ' s land. Third, nuisance by interference with a 
neighbour ' s use and enjoyment of his or her land. In the first and second 
cases it is the owner, or the occupier with the right to exclusive possession, 
who is entitled to sue. Remedies by way of abatement, injunction or 
damages may be granted. The harm caused in these cases, for example 
diminution in the value of the land, is suffered solely by the owner or 
occupier with exclusive possession so it is logical that they alone should 
recover. 
In Canary Wharf, the plaintiffs argued that the position is quite different in 
the third category. They pointed to the fact that when use and enjoyment is 
interfered with, it is the individual who suffers. The land itself is not 
damaged. Cases where the plaintiff is caused actual personal injury are 
extreme examples of such interference. In the present case the plaintiffs 
could have developed bronchial conditions as a result of the excess dust. 
Disrupted television viewing also affects the individual rather than the land. 
B The Majority Approach 
The defendants, Canary Wharf Limited, argued that many of the plaintiffs, 
while residents in the affected areas, were not in exclusive possession and 
therefore not entitled to sue in nuisance. Pill LJ, giving the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal, held that: 7 
There has been a trend in the law to give additional protection 
to occupiers in some circumstances .... it is no longer tenable 
to limit the sufficiency of that link by reference to proprietary 
or possessory interests in land. I regard satisfying that test of 
occupation of property as a home provides sufficient link with 
the property to enable the occupier to sue in private nuisance . 
6 Above n. 1, 698 per Lord Lloyd of Berwick. 
7[1996] I WLR 348,365 . 
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The Court used precedent and open judicial creativity to reach its 
decision. 8 On appeal, the majority in the House of Lords reversed this 
finding, preferring instead to follow the more traditional line of authority 
which surrounds private nuisance. 
The Lords assessed the underlying principles which distinguish the law of 
private nuisance. On the basis of those principles they identified those who 
have a right to sue for a remedy and those who do not. Lord Hope's 
comment is typical of the approach taken by the majority:
9 
It is tempting to depart from principle out of sympathy for the 
plaintiffs or in search of a remedy for some objectionable 
activity, but in this area of the law it is important to resist the 
temptation and to rely instead on the guidance of principle. 
In Lord Cooke's words, the Majority approach achieves ' a major advance 
in the symmetry of the law of nuisance'. However, too much emphasis can 
be placed on symmetry, to the detriment of decision-making which 
achieves positive and fair results for the parties. The Lords address policy 
issues to a certain extent but eschew the judicial activism shown by the 
Court of Appeal, seemingly for the sake of neat and tidy precedent in the 
law of private nuisance. The majority reach their conclusion by a process 
of deduction. This traditional mode of legal analysis ensures thorough 
contemplation of precedent. The facts and findings in earlier decisions lead 
the majority to the principle that the law of private nuisance is based on 
property alone. 
C Interest in Land 
The Lords' starting point was Malone v Laske/
0
. That case arose as a 
result of a serious physical injury caused to the plaintiff when a bracket 
supporting the water tank in the premises in which she lived was dislodged 
due to vibrations caused by machinery on adjoining premises. It was held 
8Cheer, U. 'Neighbours, Nuisance and Negligence ' [1996] NZLJ 245, 247. 
9 Above n. 1, 724. 
10(1907] 2 KB 141. 
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that she had no cause of action because she had no interest in the land on 
which the accident occurred. She only had a right to occupy the premises 
with her husband who was allowed to reside there by licence of his 
employer. Fletcher Moulton LJ added that the plaintiff 'was in the premises 
as a mere licensee, . . . and a person who is merely present in the house 
cannot complain of a nuisance which has no element of a public 
nuisance.' 11 
Malone v Laskey is an unsatisfactory authority in that no attempt was 
made in the judgments to explain what was meant by a right of occupation 
in a legal sense, nor to distinguish between the various categories of 
licensee, of which some are entitled to possession of premises and some 
are not. 12 Subsequent cases have clarified this issue to a degree. 
13 
The majority in Canary Wharf recognised that Malone v Laskey has since 
been followed in a number of cases. 
14 The English courts have, in general, 
interpreted Malone v Laskey as deciding that the plaintiff must have an 
interest in land or, at least, a legal right of occupation, in order to sue in 
private nuisance. Lord Hoffman acknowledged that nothing has been said 
in the House of Lords to cast any doubt upon the decision as it relates to 
standing to sue in private nuisance.
15 (It has been recognised that Mrs 
Malone would nowadays have a cause of action in negligence in line with 
the expanded doctrine of duty of care developed in the wake of Donoghue 
v Stevenson. 16) Attention was drawn to this point in Read v J Lyons & Co 
Ltd17by Lord Simmons with regard to the difference between nuisance and 
negligence. He stated that negligence was based on fault but protected 
interests of many kinds. Liability in nuisance was strict but protected only 
11 Above n. 10, 153-154 
12Kodilinye G. "Standing to Sue in Private Nuisance" (1989) 9 Legal Studies 284, 285 . 
13For a discussion of this see Buckley, P. The Law of Nuisance (2ed, Brookers, London, 
1996) 86-90. 
14Above n. 1, 693 per Lord Goff, for example. 
15Above n. 1, 706 . 
16[1932] AC 562. A.C. Billings & Sons Ltd. v Riden [1958] AC 240 overruled the part of 
the decision in Malone v Laskey relating to negligence. 
17[1947] AC 156, 183 . 
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interests in land. However, this was obiter and not focussed on interference 
with amenities. 
Malone v Laskey was specifically followed in Metropolitan Properties Ltd 
v Jones. 18Goddard LJ considered that the case had 'laid down in terms 
that, unless the plaintiff in an action in nuisance has a legal interest in the 
land which is alleged to be affected by the nuisance, he has no cause of 
action.' 19 In Canary Wharf Lord Hoffman considered that Goddard LJ 
took Malone v Laskey too far. 20 The defendant was in de facto possession. 
That was enough to entitle him to sue. The fact that the missing assignee 
might have had a better claim to possession was no defence. This statement 
by Hoffman LJ is illustrative of the Lord's approach. They did not follow 
the most narrow view of the scope of private nuisance. 
D Actual Occupation 
It is logical that de facto possession has been recognised as sufficient for 
standing to sue. Even in conversion, which, unlike nuisance, necessarily 
involves a reflection on the plaintiff's title, actual possession is protected 
against all but the rightful owner.21 The Lords recognised that in some 
circumstances, a plaintiff may have standing to sue notwithstanding they do 
not have absolute legal title in the affected land. For example, in Foster v 
Warblington Urban Council22the plaintiff sued for a nuisance affecting his 
oyster pond. There was much controversy over his legal right of 
occupancy. Vaughan Williams LJ said that: 23 
Even if title could not be proved, ... there has been such an 
occupation of these beds for such a length of time - not that 
length of time is really material for these purposes - as would 
entitle the plaintiff as against the defendants ... to sustain their 
action. 
18[1939] 2 All ER 202. 
19 Above n. 18, 205. 
20 Above n. 1, 706. 
21Harris v Lombard NZ Ltd [1974] 2 NZLR 161. 
22
[ 1906] 1 KB 648. 
23 Above n. 22, 659-660. 
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Actual occupation has been accepted as sufficient to maintain an action in 
other jurisdictions. In Paxhaven Holdings Ltd v Attorney General, 24 
Mahon J. held that even if the plaintiff was only a licensee, it did have 
exclusive possession of land on which it grazed its stock and this 
'possessory right' gave standing to sue in nuisance. In Mcleod v Rub-A-
Dub car Wash (Malvern)Pty Ltd, 25the judge of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria, Australia, held that a proprietary company, which was neither the 
owner nor the lessee of shop premises which were affected by a nuisance 
constituted by noise, was in actual occupation of those premises and so 
could sue. 
This is essentially as far as the majority was prepared to go. They 
considered further developments which have been recognised by some 
courts, and rejected them as having moved away from the basic property 
model upon which private nuisance is based. This was in line with the 
majority's classic legal analysis. 
E Extension of the Right to Sue. 
Difficulties as to who can sue have arisen in a number of different cases. A 
common situation is where the land affected by the defendant's state of 
affairs is occupied by a married couple, but owned by only one of them. 
Can the non-owning spouse sue? Alternatively, the children of a 
householder may be affected. What recourse should they have? There may 
be other people living in the home - other relatives, an au pair or a lodger, 
for example. What standing is appropriate for these potential plaintiffs? 
The answer to these questions have important consequences. Canary 
Wharf was the House of Lords' first opportunity to address these issues 
with such a diverse range of potential plaintiffs. The majority looked at the 
approach taken by the Canadian courts and the English Court of Appeal. 
24 [1974] 2 NZLR 185. 
25Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 29 February 1972, summarised [1976] YR 
657, quoted in Kodilinye, above n. 12, 286. 
• 
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The Manitoba decision Motherwell v Motherwell26 recognised the wider 
view of the right to sue. This case emphasised that a distinction must be 
drawn between being 'merely present' and being ' in substantial 
occupation'. It is the fact of occupation that supports the action. Clement 
JA said :27 
Here we have a wife harassed in the matrimonial home. She has 
a status, a right to live there with her husband and children. I 
find it absurd to say that her occupancy of the matrimonial 
home is insufficient to found an action in nuisance. In my 
opinion she is entitles to the same relief as her husband [the 
householder] . 
Foster was followed in Motherwell. In Lord Goff's opinion, Foster does 
not provide authority for the proposition that a person in the position of a 
mere licensee is entitled to sue.28 He felt there had been a misunderstanding 
which undermines the authority of Motherwell. However, Lord Cooke 
noted that the decision in Motherwell was essentially based on policy 
reasons .29 It is not likely that Foster was misunderstood. Rather, the judges 
chose to develop the point in the latter case. The decision in Motherwell is 
illustrative of the type of problem which arises when the right to sue is 
restricted solely to those with exclusive possession. 
The English Court of Appeal in Khorasandjian v Bush30 took a non-
traditional view of the right to sue. In that case the daughter of the house 
was being pestered and threatened by unwanted telephone calls from an ex-
friend . Dillon LJ gave the majority judgment and held that she had a cause 
of action in private nuisance. He regarded it as :31 
26 (1976) 73 DLR (3d) 62 . 
27 Above n. 26, 78. 
28 Above n. 1, 694-695 . 
29Above n. 1, 714 . 
30[1993]QB 727. 
31 Above n. 30, 735 . 
[r]idiculous if in this present age the law is that the making of 
deliberately harassing and pestering telephone calls to a person 
is only actionable in the civil courts if the recipient of the calls 
happens to have the freehold or a leasehold proprietary interest 
in the premises in which he or she has received the calls . 
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The extension of the right to sue expounded in Khorasandjian was 
subsequently used by Pill LJ in the Court of Appeal ruling on Canary 
Whar/ 32 The Lords in Canary Wharf felt the Court in Khorasandjian 
failed to apply the general rule of law.33 These two cases were in part 
based upon Motherwell, and to that extent the Lords held they were based 
on unsound reasoning. 
By overruling the decisions the majority in Canary Wharf took away the 
possibility that the right to sue could be extended as proposed by the Court 
of Appeal in Khorasandjian and Canary Wharf No one doubts that the 
House of Lords can overrule a Court of Appeal finding in some 
circumstances. However, this begs the question of whether it was the right 
decision. 
Khorasandjian is in shreds as a result of the majority' s comments. It seems 
Lords Goff, Lloyd and Hope were unduly hard in their criticism of the 
case. Goff was concerned a tort of harassment was being created by the 
back door. In light of the classic legal analysis of private nuisance this 
indeed seems to be the case. But the facts of Canary Wharf were so 
different that it is difficult to see why the majority did not at least follow 
Lord Hoffman ' s comments34 and limit the decision to cases involving 
intentional harassment, or reserve judgement, rather than overruling it 
entirely. 
The majority was partly swayed against interpreting the right to sue in the 
more liberal way proposed by the court below by the fear of uncertainty as 
32 Above n. 7. 
33 Above n. 1, 726 per Lord Hope. 
34 Above n. 1, 709. 
• 
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to who would be eligible. Lord Goff felt that the 'substantial link' test 
adopted by the Court of Appeal was an insufficiently identifiable 
category.35 He was concerned as to how the ' au pair girl or the lodger 
upstairs' would fit in to this new framework. This does not seem enough 
reason to deny redress in the clear cut cases which would likely form the 
greatest number in future actions. Lord Goff concluded that
36 
[ o ]n the authorities as they stand, an action in private nuisance 
will only lie at the suit of a person who has a right to the land 
affected. Ordinarily such a person can only sue if he has the 
right to exclusive possession of the land , such as a freeholder 
or tenant in possession, or even a licensee with exclusive 
possession. Exceptionally however, as Foster shows, this 
category may include a person in actual possession who has no 
right to be there ... But a mere licensee on the land has no right 
to sue. 
Canary Wharf thus held that those whose presence on a property is merely 
transitory should not be able to sue. 
F Nuisance as a Species of Property Law 
Lord Goff argued that the extension of the tort in the way proposed by the 
Court of Appeal would transform it from a tort to land into a tort to the 
person. 37 The decisions confuse a tort designed to protect property with 
the desire to protect people. In the majority view, extending the tort in the 
way proposed by the plaintiffs would be going too far . In the words of 
Lord Lloyd: 38 
[i]t is one thing to modernise the law by ridding it of 
unnecessary technicalities; it is another thing to bring about a 
fundamental change in the nature and scope of a cause of 
action . 
35 Above n. 1, 696. 
36Above n. 1, 695 . 
37 Above n. 1, 696. 
38 Above n. 1, 698-699. 
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The common law has always given a special place to property rights. It 
must be asked whether this is the most appropriate approach to take in 
modem times. It is not readily apparent why someone who happens to 
have exclusive possession of a home is prima facie entitled to protection 
under the tort of private nuisance while someone who does not have a legal 
interest but who nevertheless has a similarly strong attachment to their 
home cannot. Historically the notion that ' an Englishman' s house is his 
castle' has prevailed. This conception should in today' s world be held to 
include individual rights in the home, regardless of whether that home is in 
their exclusive possession. 
Neither of the Court of Appeal decisions of Canary Wharf or 
Khorasandjian revolutionise, or at the extreme abolish, the tort of private 
nuisance. In both of them the emphasis was upon the concept of a person' s 
home. The decisions merely left the court free to protect, in a realistic way 
and without undue regard for the technicalities of land law, a plaintiff's 
enjoyment of the premises where he or she lives. 
Take for example the situation where the family company owns the family 
home. 39 In such arrangements the family members are often no more than 
mere licensees. Presumably the company suffers no damage if its land is 
invaded by smell. The family has de facto possession and it seems 
unrealistic to deny them a remedy. However, under the Lords ' approach 
such a remedy would not necessarily be granted. Of course, the problem 
could be avoided by the company formally letting the property to the 
family . 
Some of the majority offered a potential concession in their otherwise hard 
line by suggesting that as wives often have some kind of beneficial interest 
in property they do not own, they might still be able to sue. 
40 The inchoate 
nature of a spouse ' s interest in a partner' s property is a very difficult area. 
39 Above n. 2, 538. 
40 Above n. 1, 696 per Lord Goff, for example. 
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There is limited certainty where the couple is married and virtually no 
certainty in determining such rights where the couple are living in a de 
facto relationship. It is not reasonable to have to cross the hurdle of 
inchoate rights to have standing to sue. A more coherent test, offering 
greater likelihood of success, would have been helpful. The unfairness 
inherent in this 'allowance' made by the majority will be explored further 
below in the discussion of the impact of the decision on women. 
The Lords offered some alternatives to expanding the right to sue in 
private nuisance. Lord Goff suggested Parliament should be responsible for 
making such changes.41 An example of the legislature making such changes 
can be seen in the recently enacted Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
(UK). Lord Hoffman felt harassment cases would be better dealt with 
under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 42 It is also 
possible that negligence will expand to cover nuisance 'use and enjoyment' 
cases for those without 'exclusive possession' of their home. These 
alternatives may allow redress to the individual, but they do not allow the 
development of a coherent law of private nuisance which would satisfy the 
expectations of the community. 
G Damages 
The decision in Canary Wharf has potential consequences so far as 
damages are concerned, because, prima facie if people other than those 
with the proprietary interest can sue, the damages awarded for loss of 
enjoyment will be greater than if only one can sue. Lord Lloyd said that the 
right to sue in private nuisance is linked to the correct measure of 
damages.43 He noted the case of Bone v Seale44 in which the plaintiffs were 
the owners of two adjoining properties and the defendant was a pig farmer. 
They were awarded damages for loss of amenity due to smell. There was 
no hint that damages should vary with the number of those occupying the 
houses as their home. The damages were assessed 'per stirpes and not per 
41 Above n. 1, 696-697. 
42 Above n. 1, 709 . 
43 Above n. 1, 701 . 
44 (1975] l WLR 797. 
• 
• 
• • • 
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capita' . Lord Hope stated that the measure of damages must in principle be 
the same. 45 
In Devon Lumber Co Ltd v MacNeilf6 dust from the defendants property 
aggravated bronchial conditions of neighbouring children. It was held that 
these individuals could receive damages. Such cases involving illness 
resulting from the nuisance illustrate the desirability of allowing standing to 
sue based on the effect on the person rather than the property interest. The 
majority analysis clearly avoids the problem of indeterminacy of damages 
as regards the numbers of possible claimants. However, this could be said 
to go against the nature of private nuisance as essentially a strict liability 
tort (in the sense that it is no defence to say that the defendant took all 
reasonable care to prevent it) . Inherent in this is the concept that once the 
proximity and requisite type of harm are established, the defendant is 
responsible for foreseeable harm caused. It is surely foreseeable that a 
number of people may be equally affected by a loss of the right to quiet 
enjoyment, irrespective of whether they are owners of that property or 
merely occupants. 
H Conclusion on the Majority Approach 
The law of private nuisance stems from interests m property and the 
majority justify restricting the right to sue in the tort to those exercising 
' exclusive possession'. In particular Lord Goff's decision shows great 
elegance. It is classic legal analysis at its finest. 
However, the approach now confirmed by the Lords 1s capable of 
generating profoundly unsatisfactory results turning on the nature of 
interests in land rather than on the substance of the interference suffered by 
the plaintiff. Lord Cooke continues his reputation as an activist member of 
the judiciary in his dissenting judgment. He was more open to developing 
the tort . The next part of this paper considers his approach . 
45Above n. 1, 725. 
46(1 987) 45 DLR (4th) 300. 
• • 
IV LORD COOKE'S DISSENT 
A Lord Cooke 's Approach to Law-making 
Lord Cooke began his dissenting judgment with an explanation:
47 
[i]f the common law of England is to be directed into the 
restricted path which in this instance the majority prefer, there 
may be some advantage in bringing out that the choice is in the 
end a policy one between competing principles . 
16 
This approach is to be commended. Issues do not tend to reach the highest 
courts if they have one simple answer. The Court of Appeal unanimously 
reached a quite different result. It seems improbable that they are, in the 
true sense of the word, "wrong". Rather, they hold a different opinion of 
the law of private nuisance and, quite possibly, of the role of the law in 
society. Lord Cooke based his reasoning on policy - the arbitrariness of the 
law and the need to adapt the law to changing social conditions. He 
concluded that it was appropriate to allow at least those in the position of 
spouses or children to be able to sue when their use or enjoyment of their 
home is interfered with. 
Unlike the majority, Lord Cooke was prepared to develop the law in line 
with community expectations. In his view, the law is no longer solely about 
the protection of property. Three of his statements made in recent years are 
indicative of his approach to law-making.48 The first, made in his 
Lordship's judicial capacity is this : "The whole of the common law is 
judicial legislation. "49 The second, made extra-judicially expands the first :50 
[t]he great majority of New Zealand judges, perhaps all, now 
openly recognise (albeit no doubt in varying degrees) that the 
47 Above n. 1, 713. 
48Sutton, R. "Lord Cooke and the Academy: the View from the Law Schools" The 
Struggle for Simplicity (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 4 April 1997) 3. 
49South Pacific 1\lfanufacturing Co Ltd v NZ Security Consultants and Investigations Inc 
[1992] 2 NZLR 282, 295 . 
inevitable duty of the Courts is to make law and that is what all 
of us do every day ... a guiding principle in many recent New 
Zealand developments, however expressed, has been the need to 
give effect to reasonable expectations. 
17 
The third statement, also extra-judicial, related to whether Parliament 
could legally declare New Zealand a republic. Lord Cooke said: 
51 
It is indeed an issue that would fall to be decided by ... the judges, 
but perforce they would have to decide it, not by defined legal 
criteria, but by vaguer considerations - largely their own sense of 
reality and of the public will. 
Of course the realm of private nuisance is much more tangible than is the 
notion of major constitutional change. But the concept behind this 
statement is witnessed in his approach in Canary Wharf Lord Cooke 
believes the general framework of legal principle needs to be broadly 
constructed so that it does not necessarily disqualify a new set of facts 
from consideration, just because earlier judges may not have foreseen 
them. 52 Within that broad framework judges must check each new result to 
see whether the law "works" . A set of rules is shown to be adequate, not 
by the wisdom of the court which initially propounded the rules, but by the 
fact that it has been tested over a period of time and not been found 
wanting. One of the difficulties with the common law is that once a set of 
rules has established itself over time, it can be difficult to change. 
B Recognition of Community Interests 
Lord Cooke advocates moving the law of private nmsance beyond its 
beginnings as a species of property law to focus on the interference 
suffered, rather than on the interest in the land. It is his belief that the 
community has found the rules to be wanting in this case. 
50"Dynamics of the Common Law" Papers of the 9th Commonwealth Law Conference 
(1990), 4. 
5 1"The Suggested Revolution Against the Crown" in P. Joseph(ed.) Essays on the 
Constitution (Brookcrs, Wellington, 1995) 28, 36. 
52 Above n. 48, 19. 
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The boundaries of the law of nuisance were established before the age of 
television and radio, motor transport and aviation, town and country 
planning, a "crowded island" and a heightened public awareness of the 
need to protect the environment. It is possible for the courts to cater for 
such developments because the forms which nuisance may take are protean 
and nuisance is a term used to cover a wide variety of tortious acts or 
omissions. This was recognised by Lord Wright in Sedleigh-Denfield. 
53 
This has made the law of nuisance a potent instrument of justice 
throughout the common law world. 
Lord Cooke considered a number of English, Canadian and United States 
cases in drawing his conclusion that spouses could sue in private nuisance. 
He agreed with Clement JA who said in Motherwell that the descriptions 
of the wife ' s position in Malone v Laskey, whatever their acceptability 
early this century, were ' rather light treatment of a wife, at least in today's 
society where she is no longer considered subservient to her husband '. 
54 
The issue as to whether children could sue was directly addressed by Lord 
Cooke. In Khorasandjian Dillon and Rose LJJ thought that if the wife of 
the owner is entitled to sue in respect of harassing telephone calls, the same 
should apply to a child living at home with her parents. He said :
55 
The persistent ringing of the telephone may be a nuisance in fact 
to all occupants of the home, not any primary target only, and all 
members of the family living there should be entitled to redress 
in law for substantial disturbance of their amenity. 
Lord Cooke was persuaded by this reasoning, as well as by the weight of 
North American jurisprudence and international standards. 
53 [1940] AC 880, 903. 
54Above n. 26, 77 . 
55Above n. 1, 71 6. 
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Lord Cooke also considered the issue of other resident members of the 
family, including de facto partners and lodgers . 56 He held that these people 
may on the particular facts fairly be considered as having a home in the 
premises and could therefore be allowed standing to complain of 'truly 
serious interference with the domestic amenities lawfully enjoyed by them. 
However, he felt the issue of eligibility for standing could be extended in 
this way without going so far as to give a remedy in nuisance to non-
resident employees in commercial premises. The employer is responsible 
for their welfare. In this way his Lordship more clearly delineates the 
vagueness of the Court of Appeal's requirement that a person claiming in 
nuisance have a "substantial link" to the land which is affected. 
The use of community expectations as a standard against which to make 
decisions can be problematic. Determining what those community 
expectations are inevitably leads to the fear that not all sections of the 
community will be represented. Who will decide what people want from 
the law? These issues need not be overwhelming. As Lord Cooke shows, 
international norms and academic opinion can be used to discover what 
society requires of its law-makers. 
C Use of International Norms 
In reaching his conclusion on the right to sue in private nuisance Lord 
Cooke referred to international conventions which deal with the right to 
family life and the importance of the home. 57 In particular, provisions of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Lord Cooke notes that these 
provisions aimed, in part, at protecting the home were construed to give 
protection against nuisances in Arrondelle v United Kingdom58 (aircraft 
noise) and Lopez Ostra v Spain59 (fumes and smells from a waste treatment 
plant). 
56 Above n. 1, 719. 
57Above n. 1, 715-716. 
58 Application No. 7889/77 (1982) 26 D.R.5 F.Sett . 
59(1994) 20 EHRR 277. 
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Lord Cooke previously used international law as an aid in shaping 
domestic law during his time as President of the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal. In Baigent 's case he applied international conventions to an 
emerging public law regime. 60 His judgment in Canary Wharf goes further 
than this by suggesting that international norms should be used in 
developing traditional tort norms. In Lord Cooke's view the community 
has come to expect that international standards will be reflected in 
domestic law-making. Lord Cooke is not alone in advocating this 
approach. For example, in the United States international law is being used 
as federal common law to prosecute perpetrators of genocide.61 
Lord Cooke's use of international standards was not commented on by the 
majority. 62 It remains to be seen whether such an approach will be adopted 
in future House of Lords decisions. But one suspects there will need to be 
a significant shift in focus among the majority before this occurs. 
D Academic Opinion 
Lord Cooke refers to academic authority in his judgment. Such work can 
help judges both on the theory of law, and on the practical effect of 
particular rules. Well researched and reasoned academic study can 
document changing social conditions and advocate reform. In the absence 
of recent judgments in an area of law, academic writing should be noted to 
the extent that it enhances a greater understanding of the broad framework 
in which the law is ideally made. 
Academic opinion seems generally to be against confining the right to sue 
in nuisance for interference with amenities to plaintiffs with proprietary 
interests in land. For example, Fleming63 wrote that the wife and family 
residing with a tenant should be protected by the law of nuisance against 
60[1994] 3 NZLR 667. 
61Bradley, C.A. and Goldsmith, J.L. , "Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position" ( 1997) 110 Harvard LR 816. 
62Lord Goff read Lord Cooke's draft judgment and commented on some aspects of it in 
his judgment, above n. 1, 697. 
63The Law oJTorts (8ed, Law Book Co Ltd., Sydney, 1992) 426. 
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forms of discomfort and also personal injuries by recognising that they 
have a 'right of occupation ' just like the official tenant. However, there is 
generally scant attention paid to the point by the textbooks. This is likely 
evidence of the paucity of authorities in this area. In his chapter on the law 
of private nuisance Fleming devoted barely a page to title to sue. Todd64 
devoted several pages and Buckley, in his book entitled The Law of 
Nuisance65 offered only half a dozen pages. 
The writers of torts textbooks generally reach their conclusions on the law 
of nuisance by a process of deduction. 66 A lot of cases, consisting of a lot 
of facts are pulled together to arrive at a principle. This leads to the 
situation where unless the issues are dealt with in the cases, they tend not 
to be addressed in the texts. This reflects the way the law of nuisance has 
developed as compared with the law of negligence, in which a process of 
induction is used. Rather than looking for the ratios of particular cases, 
subsequent negligence cases look for a general principle that lies behind 
imposing liability in earlier cases. This method allows more flexibility and 
ensures cases are considered on their general merit, rather than imposing 
liability only if their facts slot in to certain pre-defined limits . Lord Cooke' s 
approach was more a process of induction than was the majority' s. 
Lord Goff was quite scathing of the academic work in this area, 
summarising the situation with this gem: 'A crumb of analysis is worth a 
loaf of opinion.' The irony here is that Lord Goff in fact does respect 
academics. This was shown by his comment in the case of The Spiliada:67 
[j]urists are pilgrims with us on the endless road to unattainable 
perfection; and we have it on the excellent authority of Geoffrey 
Chaucer that conversations among pilgrims can be most 
rewarding. 
64Above n. 2. 
65(2ed, Brookers, London, 1996). 
66 Linden, Canadian Tort l aw (Sed, Butterworths, Toronto, 1993) does not use this 
approach. 
67(1987) AC 460, 488 . 
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It is disappointing that in this case Lord Goff merely dismissed academic 
work in the field of private nuisance instead of challenging academics to 
further explore the area. He could have requested further evidence which 
may have made him change his mind. For example, evidence of community 
expectations could have been submitted. 
E The United States Approach 
Lord Cooke' s use of United States precedent is also a fairly novel 
approach for a member of the House of Lords. Such material has tended 
not to be considered mainly because of the difficulty in gleaning helpful 
precedent from what are effectively 51 different jurisdictions. Cooke 
quotes extensively from Hosmer v Republic Iron & Steel Co68 in 
recognition of the fact the authority is not readily available. 69 The advances 
in technology which are allowing the creation of more and more 
comprehensive legal databases, mean United States material is likely to be 
seen more often in the Commonwealth jurisdictions. However, it is difficult 
to evaluate the quality of United States judgments. The fear of course, is of 
information overload and subsequent confusion. In this sense, the 
majority's blinkered approach is more readily understood. But it would not 
be a positive move for the courts to dismiss new developments on the 
premise that they may prove ' too hard '. 
V IMPACT OF THE DECISION AND ALTERNATIVE 
OPTIONS 
The majority in Canary Wharf set down a firm decision on the extent of 
the right to sue in private nuisance. But there are other ways to address the 
issue. For example, Lord Cooke's community expectation model or a 
feminist model. These options may be explored in the future. 
6860 South. 801 (Al. 191 3). 
69Above n. 1, 717-718 . 
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A Impact on Women and Children 
If the majority's classic legal analysis is followed in future cases addressing 
the issue, it seems likely their findings will be maintained and the right to 
sue will remain limited to those who can establish a proprietary interest in 
property. However, it is hoped that judges will look beyond this classic 
form and ask the harder questions relating to who the tort aims to protect. 
The majority failed to ask the right questions when analysing this issue. 
They focussed predominantly on the nature of the interest in land required, 
rather than looking to see who this would affect in reality. For the people 
who have a proprietary interest in land the majority decision will have no 
effect. But many others are not in such a position. The decision will impact 
most heavily on women and children. 
The decision is not overtly discriminatory against women or children. As it 
stands, the right to sue in private nuisance is available to those with a 
proprietary interest, be they male or female. This is an example of the law 
giving equal rights to all, providing the initial barrier of an interest in land is 
crossed. However, if the issue is examined more closely, it becomes 
apparent that the majority' s approach is wanting. In Andrews v Law 
Society of British Columbia70it was acknowledged that sameness of 
treatment does not necessarily mean equality, and that it was the impact of 
the law which should be considered, not just its intent. 
Many homes are still solely in the male spouse's name, and it is rare for 
children to be included in titles to land. The Lords expected that any action 
for interference with use and enjoyment would be taken by the 
householder. It was argued for the plaintiffs that this would cause 
inconvenience, for example, where the owner was unwilling to bring an 
action because he was less sensitive to the interference than other members 
of his family . This was dismissed by the Lords. Lord Lloyd stated :71 
70(1989] I SCR 143 . 
7 1 Above n. 1, 699. LAW LIBRARY 
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I find it difficult to visualise such a case in practice. In any 
event the inconvenience, such as it would be, does not justify a 
departure from principle. 
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Such cases may in fact be more common than the majority anticipates. For 
example the couple may be separated with the non-property owning spouse 
residing in the home by agreement for the children's sake. In such 
situations, the property owning spouse would have to be convinced to take 
action. If the relationship is less than amicable this may prove quite a 
battle. Alternatively, the non-property owning partner would need to cross 
the hurdle of inchoate rights before gaining standing. 
On the majority approach, decisions such as that made in Devon Lumber 
Co Ltd v MacNeill72 would not be possible. Children would not be eligible 
for individual recognition of the harm caused to them by the interference of 
a neighbour. 
B Alternative Approaches 
The Lords could have addressed the issue of the effect on women and 
children more thoroughly. No effort was made to assess just how great the 
impact of their decision would be. Instead of dismissing inconvenience to 
women as unlikely, the Lords could have challenged counsel to present 
figures on the numbers of family homes in single or joint names. In New 
Zealand these statistics are not specifically collated, but it would be 
possible to get an idea by looking at a sample from the council rates list 
and seeing whether payments are requested from individuals or couples. 
This would likely have been possible in England as well. 
Lord Cooke considered international conventions. Further to this 
approach, the United Nations Convention to Eliminate all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women could have been mentioned. This is a non-
discrimination treaty in which the overall model is one of substantive 
equality. The convention imposes a positive obligation on signatories to 
72 Above n. 46. 
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guarantee women's rights and protect women from disadvantage or 
discrimination on the basis of gender. 73The use of this convention would 
help show the community expectation that women should not be excluded 
from a remedy because they lack a proprietary interest. 
As discussed above, some of the Lords suggested alternative means of 
gaining redress in such situations if a person lacks the requisite proprietary 
interest to make private nuisance available. The tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional harm or statutory provisions may well be appropriate for 
some harassment cases. Negligence may expand to cover interference with 
use and enjoyment cases. But these alternatives are not of themselves 
sufficient justification for denying redress in private nuisance. The interests 
of justice would be better served by developing the tort in line with 
community expectations. 
V IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND 
A Canary Wharf's Weight in New Zealand 
De facto possession is clearly recognised as supporting an action m 
nuisance in New Zealand and at least two cases support the proposition 
that exclusive possession or occupation will suffice here: Paxhaven 
Holdings Ltd v Attorney-General74and Delta Projects Ltd v North Shore 
City Council. 75 The majority judgment will be seen as authoritative as 
regards the extent of the right to sue for plaintiffs with less than exclusive 
possess10n. 
The status of the House of Lords within New Zealand ' s jurisdiction is 
somewhat uncertain at the present time. 76 Traditionally it was very unusual 
for a New Zealand court not to follow a House of Lords decision. By 
73 As described by the Chief Justice of Alberta Catherine Fraser at the May 1997 Judicial 
Working Group 's Seminar on Gender Equity. Reported in "The application of 
substantive equality in Canada and New Zealand" Lawta/k 4 August 1997, 14. 
74Above n. 24. 
75[1996] 3 NZLR446. 
76For a discussion of this see Eichclbaum, T. "Brooding Inhibition or guiding hand? 
Reflections on the Privy Council Appeal" in P. Joseph, (ed.), Essays on the Constitution 
(Brookers, Wellington, 1996), 112. 
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comparison, there has never been the same sort of compulsion to follow 
the highest courts in other Commonwealth jurisdictions, primarily the High 
Court of Australia and the Supreme Court of Canada. But New Zealand 
courts will not necessarily follow the House of Lords. This was recognised 
by the Court of Appeal in Bognuda v Upton & Shearer_17 The Privy 
Council in Jnvercargill City Council v Hamlin 78 recognised that in some 
situations New Zealand ' s individual characteristics justify departure from 
the law as stated by the House of Lords. It remains to be seen how far 
reaching this finding will be. An analysis of this is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
As Lord Cooke is past President of New Zealand ' s Court of Appeal, his 
judgment may be given considerable weight. However, the New Zealand 
court is generally more conservative since Cooke ' s departure for the 
House of Lords. 
B Legislation 
The nuisance action itself is now often the course of last resort . This is 
because in many instances the legislature has provided a better and more 
efficient remedy by statute, particularly the Resource Management Act 
1991 . The advantage of the statutory route is that the cost of obtaining the 
appropriate remedy may be greatly reduced when compared to the cost of 
litigation. But the disadvantage of relying on statutory bodies and local 
authorities to eliminate activities interfering with the enjoyment of one ' s 
property is that those bodies and authorities are often in practice reluctant 
or very slow to act. Restraining the right to sue will have the effect of 
limiting the options of some potential plaintiffs. 
There are some areas in which the legislature does not provide a remedy. 
In these instances a potential plaintiff will have to cross the barrier of 
' exclusive possession' before they can use the private nuisance remedy. An 
example of such a situation would be where a person is being harassed by a 
77 [1972] NZLR 741. 
78(1996] I All ER 756; [1996] 1 NZLR 513 . 
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stranger. New Zealand ' s Domestic Violence Act 1995 does not extend to 
such problems. If New Zealand courts follow the majority line, and in the 
absence of a significant interest in the land, such a victim would possibly 
not have a remedy. There is a possibility the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional harm may breach the gap as suggested by Lord Hoffman. 79 
The Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 will 
prevent any action in New Zealand for basic damages in respect of 
personal injury suffered as a result of a private nuisance. However in some 
limited circumstance exemplary damages may be awarded. But the ACC 
bar on civil action does not really affect private nuisance. Most people use 
nuisance as a tort to eliminate a possible danger to their physical well-being 
before the injury occurs. If there is an actual physical injury, negligence 
acts retrospectively to compensate this. 
The majority recognised the possibility of a spouse having inchoate rights 
in a property. New Zealand is considering amending its Matrimonial 
Property Legislation to include property rights for couples in de facto 
relationships. If this goes ahead, it may be that the majority' s approach 
could be extended to include potential plaintiffs in de facto relationships . 
However, this would not overcome the uncertainty surrounding the nature 
of such inchoate rights. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The House of Lords decision in Canary Wharf is an important 
development in the tort of private nuisance. The wide range of plaintiffs 
enabled the court to focus on the question of who has a right to sue for 
interference with the use and enjoyment of land. 
The majority judgments are compelling in their elegance, yet conservative 
in their approach. The Lords offered a classic legal analysis of the issue and 
restrained the extent of the right to those with a proprietary interest in the 
79 Above n. 1, 709. 
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land interfered with. There are problems with this approach. In standing by 
long held beliefs about the primacy of property, the majority risk 
continuing the exclusion of the interests of women and of children from the 
mainstream of the common law. 
In his dissenting judgment, Lord Cooke offered an alternative approach 
which enables the expectations of the community to be considered. This 
method inevitably involved widening the traditional grounds for eligibility 
to sue in the tort. In particular, his use of international standards was a 
novel way of determining domestic law. 
There are risks in changing the focus of the law. Confusion can result as 
subsequent courts struggle to interpret new facts in light of developments. 
It must be ensured that new approaches are workable and retain the degree 
of certainty the common law strives for. However, conservatism for 
conservatism's sake is not desirable. The different analyses made by the 
Lord Cooke on the one hand and the majority on the other are perhaps best 
summarised in the famous words of Denning LJ as the difference between 
'bold spirits and timorous souls. ' 80Both approaches are tenable. It is hoped 
that in the future more emphasis will be placed on the impact a decision 
will make, rather than striving for symmetry in the law to the exclusion of 
society' s needs. 
8° Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [1951] 2 KB 164. 
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